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INTRODUCTION

The faster we deport undocumented immigrants, the safer our
country will be. 1 This belief has become a foundational tenant of the Trump
administration’s immigration regime and its increased use of the expedited
removal program. 2
Expedited removal was originally introduced in 1996 as an
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), granting the
executive branch discretion to accelerate the deportation process in limited

ǂ Sarah

Houston is a recent graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law. She became
interested in issues of citizenship and displacement during her Fulbright fellowship in Turkey
in 2014, later working in refugee camps in Greece and with NGOs in Europe to create better
technological solutions for displaced women. During her time at UVA, she represented
transgender and LGBTQ+ asylum seekers at the International Refugee Assistance Project
(IRAP) and through UVA’s Immigration Clinic. Sarah is currently an associate at Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in New York City, where she focuses on international law.
Ahead of the 2016 elections, Trump “pledged a ‘deportation force’ that would remove
millions of unauthorized immigrants,” stating that “We have at least 11 million people in this
country that came in illegally. They will go out.” Muzaffar Chishti & Sarah Pierce, Trump's
Promise of Millions of Deportations Is Yet to Be Fulfilled, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE
(Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-deportations-unfinishedmission [https://perma.cc/DX32-8SFY].
A Primer on Expedited Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 22, 2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/primer-expedited-removal
[https://perma.cc/ES2V-LTZY] (describing the surge in expedited removal deportations,
which by 2017 accounted for thirty-five percent of all removals from the U.S.).
1

2

198

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

contexts. 3 Under this fast-track program, undocumented immigrants who
have entered the country in the last two weeks can be deported without any
hearing or meaningful review, as long as they are apprehended within 100
miles of any U.S. border. 4 However, the current administration was
concerned that the program was not being utilized to its full statutory extent. 5
On July 23, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
announced a drastic expansion to the program by altering the geographic
requirements of these fast-tracked deportations. 6 Under this expanded
policy, any undocumented individual, no matter how far they are from the
border, can be placed into this fast-track system without an opportunity to
be heard or any type of review. 7 Professor Mary Holper argues that
“expedited removal has been expanded to its maximum reach. The border
is everywhere.” 8 Several organizations immediately challenged this
rulemaking. U.S. District Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson issued a preliminary
injunction against the policy change after concluding that the government
did not follow proper notice-and-comment procedures. 9
Regardless of how the legal battle unfolds, President Trump’s
expansion of expedited removal highlights a larger shift in immigration
enforcement from the border to the interior of the country. U.S.
Immigration policy has traditionally focused on the southern border,
granting Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and federal agents the
unique power to stop and detain anyone they suspect to be undocumented. 10
However, the government’s use of these heightened enforcement measures
has spread far past the borderlands, as DHS sends tactical teams to
CONG. RES. SERV., RL33109, IMMIGR. POL’Y ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS (2009),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33109.html#fn18 [https://perma.cc/NJ8J-6S2A].
Id. (arguing that the program grants border agents unchecked authority and increases
erroneous deportations).
Kat Lonsdorf, Federal Judge Blocks Trump Move To Fast-Track Deportations, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/28/765357363/federal-judgeblocks-trump-move-to-fast-track-deportations [https://perma.cc/C5Z6-H3UT]. See Exec.
Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Laurence Benenson, Expanded Expedited Removal, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (July 25, 2019),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/expanded-expedited-removal/
[https://perma.cc/TY9L-S9TD].
3

4

5

6

7

Id.

Mary Holper, Expanded Expedited Removal: Can Fourth Amendment "Border
Exceptionalism" Be Everywhere Now?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (Aug. 8, 2019),
8

https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/expanded-expedited-removal-can-fourth-amendmentborder-exceptionalism-be-everywhere-now/ [https://perma.cc/76AG-VAX3].
Lonsdorf, supra note 5 (noting that the American Civil Liberties Union, American
Immigration Council, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP were granted a preliminary
injunction in the DDC on September 27, 2019).
CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 214 (Am. Bar Ass’n
2017) (2015) [hereinafter HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION].
9

10
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sanctuary cities, 11 sets up checkpoints and patrols highways hundreds of
miles from any border, and strategically increases the number of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids nationwide. 12 This
dispersion of immigration enforcement power raises serious Fourth
Amendment issues. 13 Border officials who are legally justified in using race
as a predictive factor because of their proximity to the border, as dictated
by the seminal cases United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 14 and United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 15 are highly unlikely to stop acting on these same racebased assumptions as they creep towards the interior. 16 However, the
judiciary never meant for the border exception to be used in such an
expansive way. 17 The Supreme Court’s allowance of the use of race in key
cases challenging law enforcement’s treatment of Latinos at border stops
and searches such as Brignoni-Pence, I.N.S. v. Delgado and United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte (referenced collectively as the “undocumented cases”) is
based on the outdated notion that geography, when paired with race, is
predictive of illegality. 18 Essentially, this notion suggests that anyone who is
Caitlin Dickerson & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Border Patrol Will Deploy Elite Tactical
to
Sanctuary
Cities,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
14,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/us/Border-Patrol-ICE-Sanctuary-Cities.html
[https://perma.cc/SQZ6-C4Z9] (describing how officers from the border are being reassigned to interior regions to assist ICE and “to increase arrests in the sanctuary jurisdictions
by at least thirty-five percent.”).
Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772/
[https://perma.cc/XRR6-ENBR] (describing how border patrol has become a creeping and
“regular presence in cities such as Las Vegas and San Antonio—and its officers can be seen
cruising highways in northern Ohio.”).
Holper, supra note 8 (arguing that “expanded expedited removal violates detainees’ Fourth
Amendment rights . . . [and] seizing and jailing thousands of people suspected of immigration
violations who are found anywhere within the U.S. is a far cry from the brief stops of vehicles
or persons, which the Court upheld when they occur near the border.”).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
Deborah Anthony, The U.S. Border Patrol’s Constitutional Erosion in the “100-Mile
Zone,” 124 PENN. ST. L. REV. 391, 402–03 (2020) (describing Border Patrol agents’ targeting
stops and interrogations towards individuals based on their apparent ethnicity.) These
apparent biases are seen at both checkpoints near border areas and in locations hundreds of
miles away. Id. at 411. Border Patrol agents have reportedly offered pretextual reasons for
stopping particular motorists, including suspicion based on the way they hold the steering
wheel or the time of day they are driving, among others. Id. In some cases, agents have
reportedly admitted to profiling, with one agent stating a motorist was stopped for looking
“Mexican.” Id.).
Id. at 423 (stating that in the context of Border Patrol operations, the Fourth Amendment
is not functioning as a restraint, as intended).
Id. I adopt Carbado & Harris’ categorization of these three cases that define the permissible
use of race in border stops and searches as the “undocumented cases” which includes
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), and Martinez-Fuerte,
11

Agents

12

13

14
15
16

17

18
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located near the border and appears Latino is likely to be undocumented.
The Court concluded that this notion’s probability was high enough to
justify a more lenient Fourth Amendment standard near the border,
allowing race to be used as a permissible factor within provable cause
analysis. 19 This border search exception perpetuates a belief that agents have
special skills to determine if someone looks “illegal” and reflects the Court’s
continuing ambiguity towards Latinos as a race. 20
The Trump administration’s dramatic escalation of immigration
enforcement nationwide forces us to confront the dangers of a Fourth
Amendment exception based on probabilistic calculations in a rapidly
changing environment. Any exception to the Fourth Amendment founded
on race’s relation to other loosely defined factors, such as proximity to the
border, opens the exception to abuse. This notion is especially true when
the Court does not revisit the predictive value of those factors. Indeed, the
executive branch uses this judicial authorization of race along with the
legislative authority given by the INA to push the border search
jurisprudence beyond its intended use.
Although scholars and policymakers have questioned the
“undocumented cases” for thirty years, 21 the proposed expansion of
expedited removal makes the “undocumented cases” even more untenable
than before. As the Latino population disperses across the country in
different migration patterns, and more CBP and ICE officials apply their
border tactics in neighborhoods further from any border, it is evident that
proximity to Mexico no longer holds the same predictive value. Geography
can no longer be a justification for the use of race in the immigration
enforcement context. It is time for the Court to strike down the outdated
border search exception, which threatens Latinos’ liberties across our
nation. 22
428 U.S. 543; see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1550 (2011).
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878, 881.
Carbado & Harris, supra note 18, at 1597 (arguing that “the erasure of Latinos as a race
19
20

has a long juridical history facilitated by their formal classification as white. Conceiving of
Latinos as whites--as an ethnic rather than a racial group--has made their experience with
racial profiling less legible as a racial practice.”).
See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ROAD TO RACIAL PROFILING WAS PAVED BY
IMMIGRANTS: RACIAL CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE 21 CENTURY 237, 248–51
(Salvatore Palidda, ed. 2011); see also Kristen Connor, Updating Brignoni-Ponce: A Critical
Analysis of Race-Based Immigr. Enforcement, 11(3) N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 591
(2008) (describing several congressional attempts to overrule Brignoni-Ponce and force
Border Patrol agents to end racial profiling through the End Racial Profiling Act).
I use the term “Latino” throughout this paper as a blanket term to encompass persons from
Mexico, Central, and South America. See Connor, supra note 21, at n.5 (adopting Latino in
the same way, but acknowledging that the “term[] ignores the racial and cultural diversity of
the Latino population, which includes people with various colors of skin, hair, and eyes.”).
21

ST

22
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This paper first traces the enduring legacy of border exceptionalism
in both the judicial and executive sphere. It then presents the three main
reasons why race should no longer be deemed a justifiable factor in the
immigration enforcement context. First, the make-up of the country is
significantly different than when the “undocumented cases” were decided,
decreasing the probability that a person who appears Latino will, in fact, be
undocumented. 23 Second, the immigration enforcement regime has
drastically expanded beyond the border region and its traditional federal
focus, as state and local actors throughout the country take an active role in
immigration enforcement through 287(g) agreements and state legislation. 24
The widening scope of this regime increases the likelihood that race is being
used in contexts never condoned by the judiciary. 25 Finally, the immigration
exception to racial profiling has been unequally applied by the lower
courts, 26 resulting in an unregulated space in which drug and immigration
enforcement converge. 27 As the immigration system expands in such drastic
ways, courts must finally acknowledge that this jurisprudence has led to the
mass incarceration of Latinos, who are significantly overrepresented in
removal proceedings and jails. 28
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

History of Expedited Removal

In 1996, Congress passed expedited removal as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) “to
combat what was perceived to be an abuse of the asylum system by
Richard Fry and Kim Parker, Early Benchmarks Show ‘Post-Millennials’ on Track to Be
Most Diverse, Best-Education Generation Yet, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOC. &
23

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/11/15/earlybenchmarks-show-post-millennials-on-track-to-be-most-diverse-best-educated-generationyet/ [https://perma.cc/M8VX-LPZ2] (stating that the number of Latinos born in the U.S. has
increased over time, with twenty-four percent of Latino Millennials having been born outside
of the U.S. in 2002, compared to only twelve percent of Latino post-Millennials in 2018).
State and local law enforcement are authorized to act as de facto immigration officers under
287(g) agreements, named for the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
National Map of 287(g) Agreements, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR.,
https://www.ilrc.org/national-map-287g-agreements [https://perma.cc/6CZC-WPPA].
24

25
26

Id.
See infra note 139 and accompanying text (listing cases that illustrate conflicting

interpretations of the border search exception).
See infra Part III.C (describing how border enforcement officers have become leading
figures in drug enforcement efforts).
See generally TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, DEPORTED: IMMIGRANT POLICING,
DISPOSABLE LABOR AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2015) (observing that Latino males are
significantly overrepresented in the number of deportees relative to their percentage of the
immigrant population and the unauthorized immigrant population).
27

28
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unauthorized migrants.” 29 Expedited removal allowed low-level immigration
enforcement officials to deport any non-citizen they apprehended within
100 miles of the border who had been present in the U.S. for less than two
weeks. 30 As a policy, DHS has prioritized the expedited removal of
Mexicans and Canadians with prior criminal records. 31 But, unlike
immigrants in removal hearings who have the right to present their case in
front of an immigration judge in court and to appeal, 32 those apprehended
under expedited removal are given no opportunity to hire representation or
explain themselves in a formal hearing. 33
Instead, the CBP officer who initially apprehends the individuals
wears three hats: law enforcer, prosecutor, and judge. 34 They have
unchecked authority to determine if the detainee fits the law’s criteria, and
the burden rests on the detainee to show they do not fit the criteria. 35
Without the time to gather evidence or call an attorney, most non-residents
detained under this process are deported within one day. 36 Many critics of
the policy argue that the lack of due process and the likelihood of erroneous
deportation to a country where the person faces imminent harm or death is
too great to take away the right to appeal the decision. 37 However, appealing
an expedited removal determination is almost impossible. 38
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, American Exile: Rapid Deportations that Bypass the Courtroom
1,
4
(2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/120214expeditedremoval_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWL3-NW6D].
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (stating that anyone at the border who makes misrepresentations
and false claims of U.S. citizenship or lacks valid entry documents is subject to expedited
removal).
69 Fed. Reg. 48877–48881 (Aug. 11, 2004).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
Kristin Macleod-Ball, Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, Trina Realmuto, Mary Kenney & Jennifer
Chang Newell, Practice Advisory-Expedited Removal: What has Changed Since Executive
Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, NAT’L
IMMIGR.
PROJECT
9
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/gen/201
7_17Feb-expedited-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M2C-KXGG].
Id. at 3.
29

30

31
32
33

34
35

Id.
Fact

Sheet: Expedited Removal, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (June 4, 2019),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-expedited-removal/
[https://perma.cc/PN6N-MUCA].
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL
– A STUDY AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 605 OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ACT OF 1998 (2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/report-asylumseekers-in-expedited-removal [https://perma.cc/FT5T-SMQX] (finding that border patrol
officers were illegally turning people away who were seeking asylum with follow up reports
seeing little improvements).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) bars appellate courts from reviewing expedited
removal orders on petitions for review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), (e); see also Shunaula
v. Holder, 732 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2013); Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010);
36

37

38
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There has always been a geographical rationale underpinning the
statute, and all successive extensions of the program “have focused almost
exclusively on geographic location.” 39 The statute allows officers near the
border to stop new entrants right when they enter the country, 40 saving U.S.
tax dollars and preventing undocumented people from spending extended
time in detention. It is the metaphorical plug that stops the undocumented
immigrants’ flood before they travel to other areas where they are more
difficult to apprehend. But proponents can no longer justify this process by
calling on geography, arguing that those within 100 miles of the border are
much more likely to be undocumented than anyone else. When President
Trump issued an Executive Order 41 exposing a much larger population to
this fast-track system, he signaled to the entire country that the immigration
priorities of the past no longer guided enforcement practices of the
present. 42 To better understand the dangers of an expedited removal process
pushed to its statutory limit, it is necessary to first analyze the border
exception that allows officers to target Latinos and place them on this fast
track solely because of their race.

B.

Immigration Exceptionalism on the Border

Although U.S. courts have agreed that “[r]acially selective law
enforcement violates this nation’s constitutional values at the most
fundamental level,” 43 they have carved out an exception when it comes to
Brumme v. I.N.S., 275 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2001). It does allow for Habeas petitions in very
limited situations, but only if a petitioner can show they are a legal permanent resident,
refugee, or were granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(2)(A)–(C).
Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited
Removal, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 579 (2007) (noting how the 2002, 2004, and 2006
expansions applied the fast-track to larger swaths of land and sea, “conflict[ing] with the
traditional due process framework whereby non-citizens who have already entered the
United States are afforded traditional due process rights.”).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3).
Exec. Order No. 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,
82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
See Halimah Abdullah and Alexandra Jaffe, Trump Signs Executive Orders Aimed at
Cracking Down on Illegal Immigration, NBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017, 4:40 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-signs-executive-orders-aimed-crackingdown-illegal-immigration-n712096 [https://perma.cc/N585-99ZL].
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003). See also
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 270 (1995), stating that “any person, of whatever race, has right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under strictest of judicial scrutiny.”); see generally WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE 43–48 (1988); John P Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding
of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 445–46.
39

40
41

42

43
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law enforcement activity on the border. 44 Devon W. Carbado and Cheryl I.
Harris argue that the Supreme Court has created an “immigration
exceptionalism” within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
constitutionalizing the use of race in the immigration context through its
“undocumented cases.” 45 The “undocumented cases,” are not widely
recognized or discussed as examples of racial profiling within criminal
procedure scholarship. 46 But in each case, race is used as a predictive factor
for illegality. 47 Brignoni-Ponce required an officer to have reasonable
suspicion before stopping a vehicle but clarified that race could be one of
several factors the officer relied on to overcome the reasonable suspicion
bar if the stop was near the border. 48 The Court justified this exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of race by emphasizing the
importance of border control efforts in the national security arena, which
required greater executive discretion in such a high-stakes context. 49
Martinez-Fuerte went a step further, establishing the rule that no reasonable
suspicion was necessary for officers to refer a vehicle to a secondary
inspection area near the border because “the intrusion is sufficiently
minimal [so] that no particularized reason need exist to justify it.” 50 The
Court ignored legitimate stigmatization concerns when it gave border patrol
officers wide discretion to order anyone to a secondary site for further
inspection, even if this order was based solely on their apparent Mexican
ancestry. 51 Justice Brennan lamented the majority’s decision in his clear
dissent: “[t]hat law in this country should tolerate use of one’s ancestry as
probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any
circumstances.” 52 Bernard E. Harcourt argues that these early cases, still the
only two Supreme Court cases to expressly approve of race as a factor in an
officer’s decision to stop and investigate an individual, “paved the
constitutional path to racial profiling.” 53 This path is firmly intact, as

44
45
46
47

Carbado & Harris, supra note 18, at 1550.

Id.
Id.
Id.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (“The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant
factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are
aliens.”).
Id. at 878–81 (holding that stops are nothing more than a “minimal intrusion” and the
“public interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the
Mexican Border”).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
Id. at 562–64.
Id. at 571 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
HARCOURT, supra note 21, at 251.
48

49

50
51
52
53
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evidenced by the fact that virtually no federal constitutional challenges to
racial profiling have prevailed since Brignoni. 54
When the Court rejected the heightened scrutiny traditionally
applied to race-based determinations by overtly condoning it in the
immigration context, it justified this deviation by emphasizing the border’s
centrality in the nation’s fight for national security. 55 The Court’s decisions
reflect a belief that took hold of the nation in the late 1970s and early 1980s
that “there is something uniquely difficult and uniquely dangerous about the
border.” 56 The “undocumented cases” were decided in a period when the
war on drugs permeated the national consciousness, and the southwest
border was viewed as the weak link facilitating the epidemic. 57 Politicians
created a national discourse that amplified the border’s dangerousness by
blending drug and immigration concerns, justifying the increased power
given to border patrol agents through the language of war. 58 According to
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, “the Supreme Court’s cases about
stops at some distance from the international boundary make it clear that,
in the justices’ view, the border region is exceptional” and its officers, who
are vastly outnumbered by stealth migrants, “need extraordinary flexibility
if they are to successfully fight crime.” 59 But this jurisprudence
unintentionally strengthened long-held racial connections to exclusion.
When the Court stepped outside the bounds of normal Fourth Amendment
doctrine, it constitutionalized the idea that “apparent Latino ancestry
renders a person presumptively an undocumented noncitizen” even if they
are a U.S. citizen or lawful green card holder. 60
The executive branch has also routinely upheld the use of race to
justify immigration enforcement encounters, even when it forbade racial
Id.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 563; Carbado & Harris, supra note 18, at 1607 (“[T]he U.S. Department of Justice
guidelines on racial profiling, which seek to ban the practice, cite [Brignoni-Ponce] as a basis
54
55

for instructing officers that they may consider race in making investigatory stops at the
borders or in connection with national security.”).
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION supra note 10; see e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606, 619 (1977) (“Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or
item in question had entered into our country from outside.”).
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION supra note 10, at 217.
Id. (chronicling how border security became a top national security issue as “the language
of war that was gaining popularity in the drug context was repurposed to discuss
immigration”).
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Racial Profiling in Immigration Policing Lives on,
CRIMMIGRATION BLOG (Dec. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Hernández, Racial Profiling in
Immigration
Policing],
http://crimmigration.com/2014/12/09/racial-profiling-inimmigration-policing-lives-on/#_ftnref2 [https://perma.cc/339E-N3QL].
Carbado & Harris, supra note 18, at 1546.
56

57
58

59

60
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considerations everywhere else. In 2014, the country was in a period of
acute racial tension after police shot and killed Tamir Rice, Michael Brown,
and Eric Garner, but none of the white officers were charged in the deaths
of these three African American victims. 61 The Department of Justice
responded by expanding its prohibition on racial profiling. 62 The 2014 DHS
Guidance Memo to federal enforcement officials on the use of race,
ethnicity, and other protected categories was praised as a step in the right
direction towards the eradication of race in law enforcement decision
making. 63 However, footnote two of the memo clarified that “this Guidance
does not apply to interdiction activities in the vicinity of the border.” 64 The
rationale underlying this caveat was that immigration officials, as frontline
fighters in the border crisis, have developed a special skill to “know when
and how racial markers provide evidence of immigration status.” 65 In
Brignoni-Ponce, Justice Powell echoed this sentiment, accepting the
government’s argument that “trained officers can recognize the
characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such
factors as the mode of dress and haircut.” 66
The DHS footnote two exception builds upon the “undocumented
cases” to create a new construct of citizenship that is visibly inscribed on
certain individuals’ bodies in place of traditional probable cause. 67 But we
no longer live in a world where this exceptionalism is being deployed
Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. announces new rules to curb racial profiling by federal law
enforcement, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-

61

security/justice-dept-to-announce-new-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-by-federal-lawenforcement/2014/12/07/e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html
[https://perma.cc/CMK4-YWYS].
62
63

Id.
See Hernández, Racial Profiling in Immigration Policing, supra note 59 (“Though there is

much to laud in this announcement, the new guidance, as has been widely reported, leaves
a gaping hole in the Justice Department’s attempts to remove race from federal officers’
criminal investigation calculus because it explicitly exempts immigration policing activity
along the border.”).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding the Use
64

of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation, or Gender
Identity
(Dec.
2014),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-racepolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/78R5-4P7Q] (superseding the DOJ’s 2003 Guidance Regarding
the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies).
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Criminalizing Immigration, 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 205, 219 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) [hereinafter
Chacón, Criminalizing Immigration]. But see id. at 220 (arguing it is impossible to use street
policing or car stops to find illegal immigrants because it “requires not a ‘sense’ about national
origin, but an awareness of an individual’s immigration status—a complex legal determination
that can never be made by watching someone go about their daily business”).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975).
Mary Romero, Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual
Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 447 (2006).
65

66
67
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infrequently along the border. 68 The Trump administration has used the
“undocumented cases” to justify enforcement actions far exceeding the
Justices’ original intent. 69
After tracing the enduring legacy of border exceptionalism in both
the judicial and executive spheres, this paper now presents three reasons
why race can no longer be used to justify immigration stops and searches.
III.

A.

RACE CAN NO LONGER JUSTIFY IMMIGRATION
STOPS AND SEARCHES

Demographic Shift – Latinos as a Majority Presence

First, the probative value of Latino appearance in probable cause
analysis is drastically less than the Court posited in the 1970s because they
are so many more people who fit under this distinction today. 70 Indeed,
current demographic statistics reveal a much larger and more dispersed
Latino population than when the “undocumented cases” were decided. 71 In
Brignoni-Ponce, and later Martinez-Fuerte, the Court adopted the
government’s estimate that “85% of the aliens illegally in the country are
from Mexico.” 72 However, the 1970 census data and INS figures the Court
relied on only represented the number of Mexican immigrants who were
documented with the government in border states, but did not indicate the
quantity of undocumented immigrants within the population of those with
Hispanic appearance. 73 Meaning, the data did not indicate how many people
with a Mexican appearance were actually undocumented immigrants. 74 By
focusing only on undocumented individuals, the dataset only provided
See Kavitha Surana, How Racial Profiling Goes Unchecked in Immigration Enforcement,
PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/racial-profilingice-immigration-enforcement-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/MWH3-RAQL].
See, e.g., Chacón, Criminalizing Immigration, supra note 65, at 212–14, 222 (describing
how the Trump administration rolled back enforcement priorities of past presidencies,
threatened to take away funding from sanctuary cities, and drafted state officers to enforce
federal laws).
See Robert Alan Culp, The Immigration and Naturalization Service and Racially Motivated
Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the Fourth Amendment Left Off?, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 800, 817 (1986).
Luis Noe-Bustamante, Mark Hugo Lopez & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Hispanic
population surpassed 60 million in 2019, but growth has slowed, PEW RES. CTR. (July 2,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/08/u-s-hispanic-population-reachednew-high-in-2018-but-growth-has-slowed/ [https://perma.cc/5HUP-EF7X].
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) (citing United States v. Baca,
368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973), which based its estimation on a 1974 DOJ report);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551 (1976) (citing United States v. Baca, 368
F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
See Culp, supra note 70, at 816.
68

69

70

71

72

73
74

Id.
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exclusive analysis when “[i]nclusive analysis of statistics are far more
pertinent for purposes of equal protection analysis since they reflect the
probability that a particular individual is undocumented.” 75 In other words,
the Court had no data to back up its assertion that the probability that any
individual who appears Mexican is undocumented is high enough to make
Hispanic appearance a probative factor. 76
Furthermore, such a high estimate was called into question when
the 1980 census data revealed that only one-eighth of the Latino population
in those border states was undocumented. 77 Only five years after the
Brignoni decision, scholars concluded that “the probative connection
between Hispanic appearance and undocumented status is much weaker
than the Court perceived when it developed its standards of reasonable
suspicion.” 78 The statistics justifying the border exception never rested on
solid ground.
Notwithstanding the debates surrounding this data, it is evident that
the numbers do not reflect the ethnic make-up of the undocumented
population in America today. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there
are now more than 60 million Latinos across the country, 79 making up over
18 percent of the entire population. 80 This is a staggering increase from 1970
when the 9 million Latinos in the U.S. accounted for a mere 4.5 percent of
the entire population. 81 The probability that any person within this vast,
more diverse Latino population is undocumented is even harder to
rationalize than it was in 1975. In United States v. Montero-Camargo, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged this population shift as one of the central
reasons for its rejection of Hispanic appearance as a permissible factor,
citing a statistic that the Latino population in border states had increased
five-fold since Brignoni-Ponce was decided. 82 Under the current
75
76
77
78

Id.

Connor, supra note 21, at 575–76.
Culp, supra note 70, at 817.

Id.

Noe-Bustamante et al., supra note 71 (finding from 2010–2019, Latino grew from 16% of
total U.S. population to 18%, accounting for 52% of all population growth).
CENSUS BUREAU, Population Estimates Program: Quick Facts (July 1, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/GG6GSTXB] (noting that 18.5% of population reported race as “Hispanic or Latino”).
Carl Haub, Changing the Way U.S. Hispanics Are Counted, POPULATION REFERENCE
BUREAU
(Nov.
7,
2012),
https://www.prb.org/us-census-and-hispanics/
[https://perma.cc/WKM5-G8MW] (citing 1970 U.S. Census Bureau data that reported
9,072,602 Hispanics in the U.S. out of a total population of 203,211,926, which calculates to
4.5 percent).
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Hispanic
appearance is of little or no use in determining which particular individuals among the vast
Hispanic populace should be stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal
aliens.”).
79

80

81

82

2020]

NOW THE BORDER IS EVERYWHERE

209

demographics, Hispanic appearance alone can never be a meaningful factor
to predict who is undocumented within the wider population. 83
Moreover, Latinos are much more dispersed across the nation than
they were in 1975. 84 Ironically, the increased enforcement along the border
has caused Mexican and other Latino migrants to spread across the
country. 85 The traditional migration routes have been abandoned for new
paths that place less traffic in the border states. 86 As a result of the border
walls erected in California and increased militarization across the frontier,
Mexican immigration “transformed from a largely circular movement of
male workers going to three states into a settled population of families living
in 50 states.” 87 Census data reflects this geographic diffusion. 88 From 2010 to
2019, the states that accounted for the largest Latino population growth rates
were not located in the South, but in places like Washington, D.C. and
North Dakota. 89 Latino populations of over one million now reside in nonborder counties such as Miami-Dade, Florida; Cook County, Illinois; and
Riverside County, California. 90 As more and more non-border
municipalities become majority Latino, the likelihood that the border
search exception will be misapplied to racially profile huge portions of these
localities increases.
Continuing to allow officers to use Latino appearance as a proxy for
illegality in areas with high concentrations of Latinos has led to liberty abuses
against our citizens. U.S. citizens’ rights are being violated as they are
searched, detained, and even deported on account of their Latino
appearance. 91 Jacqueline Stevens conducted a study finding that more than
20,000 U.S. citizens were wrongfully detained or deported between 2003

Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1133–34.
See Douglas S. Massey, The New Latino Underclass: Immigration Enforcement as a RaceMaking Institution, STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY AND INEQ. 1, 16–17 (2012).
See id.
Id. at 17.
E.g., Jens M. Krogstad, A view of the nation’s future through kindergarten demographics,

83
84
85

86
87
88

PEW
RES.
CTR.
(July
31,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/07/31/kindergarten-demographics-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/K98U-3F23] (noting
that in 18 states, Latino children accounted for 20% or more of the public school
kindergarten population in 2017).
Noe-Bustamante et al., supra note 71 (noting between 2010-2019, the states with the largest
growth rates were North Dakota (129%), South Dakota (66%), Montana (50%), New
Hampshire (48%), and the District of Columbia (42%)).
Id. (listing U.S. counties with largest Hispanic populations).
See generally Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting
U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011).
89

90
91
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and 2010. 92 In Miami, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) found that ICE issued 420 detainers on U.S. citizens between 2017
and 2019, wrongfully holding these citizens for deportation. 93 The ACLU
report posits that “ICE may now be targeting hundreds of U.S. citizens each
year in states like Florida.” 94 Furthermore, immigration officials have
wrongfully imprisoned individuals with valid work and tourist visas,
longtime residents with families who are U.S. citizens, children, and asylum
seekers with legitimate, credible fear claims who are deported back to their
deaths. 95 Many of those wrongfully held or deported brought class-action
lawsuits challenging this discrimination, but most attempts have been
dismissed for lack of standing. 96
The “undocumented cases” grant the Trump administration the
legal safeguards to racially profile and wrongfully detain thousands of its
citizens and legal residents without probable cause. Under the expanded
expedited removal processes, those wrongfully detained have no right to a
lawyer and are often coerced into signing life-altering legal documents they
do not understand. 97 Even if one agrees that non-citizens should be afforded
fewer rights than U.S. citizens, the border exception jurisprudence impedes
on the rights of people that we have always agreed enjoy the full protection
of our Constitution. The Fourth Amendment carve out can no longer be
justified when it ignores and cheapens citizens' and lawful residents’
protections, which are guaranteed by the Constitution and federal law. If the
Court does not clarify and revise the scope of this exceptionalism, the
Trump administration’s immigration regime will continue to apply it in
environments never dreamed of by the Justices. Thus, in a nation of sixty
million Latinos who dress, look, and act in such diverse ways, the
Id. (finding “that the banishment, and in some cases kidnapping, of U.S. citizens by
immigration law enforcement agencies is continuing with an alarming albeit underreported
frequency.”).
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, Citizens on Hold: A Look at ICE’s Flawed Detainer System in
Miami-Dade County, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION FLA. 1, 2 (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.aclufl.org/en/publications/citizens-hold-look-ices-flawed-detainer-system-miamidade-county [https://perma.cc/GU2Z-5JAK].
Id. at 6 (finding that “[i]f Miami’s experience is representative, ICE may now be targeting
hundreds of U.S. citizens each year in states like Florida.”).
E.g., Am. Civ. Liberties Union, supra note 29 (providing the example of Laura S., who told
border officials she had a credible fear of death but was sent back to Mexico, where she was
murdered within days).
E.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the
plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood that these discriminatory stops would occur again); Farm
Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 723, 733 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (holding the Latino plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin border patrol agents).
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, supra note 29, at 2 (documenting the highly coercive
environments detainees experience as they are lied to about their rights and threatened so
they will sign papers without understanding the high-stakes consequences).
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proposition that appearing Latino means you are likely to be illegal has no
contemporary validity. 98

B.

The Creeping Expansion of Immigration Enforcement Past the
Border

Second, the Court’s untouched border search jurisprudence has
taken on new power as both the geographical area of enforcement and the
number of officials with enforcement authority expands. When we examine
the current geographical areas of enforcement, it is evident that CBP is
pushing its purview past its original edict, subjecting countless U.S. residents
to a border exceptionalism absent the geographic constraint.
Under the 100-mile rule, codified in section 287 of the INA, agents
within 100 miles of any border can stop and search vessels without justifying
these acts based on probable cause. 99 Federal law even allows agents to
extend this “reasonable distance” line if the chief patrol agent “determines
that such action is justified, [and] declare[s] such distance to be
reasonable.” 100 In practice, agents have not been required to justify stops or
searches as they move closer to, or even past, the 100-mile mark. 101 With its
increased budget, 102 the CBP has established thirty-five checkpoints that
“operate deep in the interior,” even as data proves these stops are ineffective

98

See Noe-Bustamante et al., supra note 71.

8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2018) (granting power to stop and search anywhere “within a
reasonable distance from any external boundary,” which was later defined as 100 miles
through regulation). This 100-mile rule was first judicially applied in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268, 272 (1973) (allowing for warrantless searches “within a
reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States.”) (internal quotes
omitted).
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2020).
E.g., Senator Patrick Leahy was stopped at a checkpoint 125 miles south of the border,
inspiring him to introduce legislation that would shrink the permissible border zone; see
American Civil Liberties Union, U.S. Border Patrol Interior Checkpoints: Frequently Asked
Questions,
AM.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
BORDER
LITIG.
PROJECT,
https://www.aclusandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Border-Patrol-CheckpointFAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/97DR-MHER].
CBP’s budget is the highest it has ever been, ballooning from $5.9 billion in FY 2003 to
$17.1 billion in FY 2019. The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security, AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(July
2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_cost_of_immig
ration_enforcement_and_border_security.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3G7-EHZF].
99

100
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102
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in apprehending illegal immigrants. 103 Yet courts have not held these stops
to a different constitutional standard. 104
Even if we assumed that federal agents closely followed the 100mile “reasonable distance” rule that the Supreme Court adopted several
decades ago, there is strong reason to question the arbitrary nature of this
distinction.
The 100-mile radius covers nine of the ten largest American cities
and affects most Americans, as two-thirds of Americans now live within this
orbit. 105 The ACLU has challenged this 100-mile rule as illogical in today’s
environment, when “[t]he reality is that Border Patrol's interior enforcement
operations encroach deep into and across the United States, affecting the
majority of Americans.” 106 CBP’s growing presence in non-border areas was
made possible by a dramatic increase in the total number of border patrol
officers, ballooning from 4,139 in 1992 to 21,000 in 2014. 107 As more CBP
agents work farther away from the border, they are not given the proper
training to know where this race exception ends, granting them the freedom
to “routinely ignore or misunderstand the limits of their legal authority.” 108
Melissa del Bosque, Checkpoint Nation: Border Agents are Expanding Their Reach into
Country’s
Interior,
HARPER’S
MAG.
(Oct.
2018),
https://harpers.org/archive/2018/10/checkpoint-nation-cbp-search-and-seizures-civil-rightsabuses/ [https://perma.cc/T5N8-9HGQ] (noting that “CBP’s own data suggests that its
interior checkpoints do little to catch what it calls ‘unauthorized entrants’ and instead ensnare
US citizens on minor drug charges.”); see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-18-50, Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints
(2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688201.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5S-2M3Q].
Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 129, 141 (2010) [hereinafter Chacón, Border Exceptionalism],
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol38/iss1/14 [https://perma.cc/3HTW-W8R3] (citing
Martinez-Fuerte as an example of the court applying the same exception to a checkpoint
almost 90 miles from the Mexican border).
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone?redirect=node/4524
[https://perma.cc/8AAX-7XEM].
Id. (noting 200 million people live within the 100-mile radius); see also Am. Civ. Liberties
Union, Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) 100-Mile Rule, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-factsheet-customs-and-border-protections-100-milezone?redirect=immigrants-rights/aclu-fact-sheet-customs-and-border-protections-100-milezone [https://perma.cc/ETC4-UTFW] (arguing for a change to the 100-mile rule because
“[a]llowing CBP to divert its attention from the border distracts from its primary mission and
results in widespread violations of Americans’ rights to property and liberty, including Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional violations.”).
Daniel Denvir, Curbing the Unchecked Power of the U.S. Border Patrol, BLOOMBERG
CITY LAB (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/10/curbing-the-uncheckedpower-of-the-us-border-patrol/413392/ [https://perma.cc/5VL2-W5KW] (arguing with this
increase, “Border Patrol has normalized policing practices that would be considered patently
unconstitutional if carried out by local police.”).
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, supra note 29.
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Furthermore, the type of actors involved in immigration
enforcement has expanded. The exclusive jurisdiction the federal
government held within the immigration realm is now a thing of the past.
Local and state officials all over the country increasingly have the power to
stop and question individuals based solely on their race. 109 This expansion
began when federal officials started to recruit local law enforcement as
“force multipliers” through the 287(g) program, 110 which empowered local
and state actors to question and detain suspected illegal immigrants
contacted while on patrol or those already in custody. These federal-local
partnerships have created a continuous information pipeline between
federal and local officials, transforming the way immigration data is shared
and used. 111 A 2011 study by Doris Provine and Gabriella Sanchez found
that legislation bringing state and local law enforcement into the immigration
sphere has created a new removal regime which “encourages entho-racial
profiling, hyper-surveillance, abusive stops, problematic searches and
unwarranted detention of suspected unauthorised [sic] immigrants.” 112
Alongside these 287(g) agreements, we have witnessed the rise of
state and local immigration ordinances that went above and beyond any
federal mandate. 113 These federal-state partnerships emboldened many local
Maria Christina Morales & Denise Delgado, What is Your Citizenship Status? Racial and
Citizenship Profiling by Law Enforcement along the U.S.-México Border, 6 (2017)

109

(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Texas at El Paso Center for InterAmerican and Border Studies) (finding that “[s]cholars have argued that the growth in
immigration policing at the local level is a response to rapid increase in the growth of
immigrant populations and/or the browning of the population.”).
President Trump revoked the Obama administration’s restrictions on the 287(g)
agreements, which had prioritized only illegal immigrants with serious criminal histories or
those who had just entered the country. Under President Trump’s new guidelines, anyone
who is unauthorized is a priority. See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigr.
&
Customs
Enf’t
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discreti
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYG3-Y6YE] (outlining new enforcement guidelines); see also
David A. Martin, Trump’s Order on the Deportation of Undocumented Residents,
Annotated by an Immigration Law Expert, VOX (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.vox.com/thebig-idea/2017/1/28/14416616/executive-order-immigrants-sanctuary-trump
[https://perma.cc/T6Q4-GY8T] (describing how the vague and sweeping terms of the Order
erase any priority hierarchy).
Doris Marie Provine & Gabriella Sanchez, Suspecting Immigrants: Exploring Links
Between Racialized Anxieties and Expanded Police Powers in Arizona, 21 POLICING &
SOC’Y 468, 477 (2011) (finding “[t]he number of federal immigration agents embedded in
local departments has also been increasing. A series of three nationwide surveys of local
police executives in cities and county sheriffs reveals that consultation between local police
and federal officials is routine in connection with specific cases.”).
Id. at 468.
See generally 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States, NAT’L CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATORS
1
(Jan.
1–Dec.
7,
2011),
110

111
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forces to the detriment of their communities. In fact, a 2009 U.S.
Government Accountability Office report concluded some agencies were
“using their 287(g) authority to process for removal of aliens who have
committed minor crimes” even though ICE indicated 287(g)’s program
objective was to enhance security by “addressing serious criminal activity
committed by removable aliens.” 114 One of the most infamous 287(g)
agreements in Maricopa County, Arizona was invalidated when experts
discovered that “Latino drivers were between four to nine times more likely
to be stopped than similarly situated non-Latino drivers.” 115 After the 287(g)
agreement was signed, the Arizona legislature passed S.B. 1070, which
criminalized acts that were neither civil nor criminal violations under federal
law. 116 In Arizona v. U.S., the Supreme Court struck down parts of the state
law. 117 However, a key provision requiring state officers to inquire about
immigration status during routine stops and provide this information to
federal officials was left untouched. 118 In this decision, “the Court
unequivocally established that there was space for states to indirectly enforce
immigration at the local level,” making it so any interaction with police could
be used as a tool for mass deportation. 119

https://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ImmFinalReportDec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GMV-9VGB] (describing how “[f]ive states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana,
South Carolina and Utah—crafted omnibus laws following the example of Arizona’s 2010
bill, SB 1070,” which required state law enforcement to attempt to determine the citizenship
of anyone involved in a lawful stop); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing
Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 628 (2013) (“they have deployed a host
of criminal laws and ordinances to achieve indirectly that which they cannot achieve directly:
the regulation of immigration law in their states.”).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, Immigration Enforcement: Better
114

Controls Needed Over Program Authorizing State and Local Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Laws, 4 (2009).
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill
Montgomery, Cty. Attorney, Maricopa Cty. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/mcso_findletter_12-1511.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SD9-8DBJ].
Chacón, Border Exceptionalism, supra note 104, at 622.
567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
Id. At 414.
Naomi Doraisamy, Erasing Presence Through Reasonable Suspicion: Terry and Its
Progeny as a Vehicle for State Immigration Enforcement, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 409, 437 (2018).
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117
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The wave of state-led action has not subsided. Alabama, 120 Texas, 121
and Idaho 122 followed Arizona’s path by introducing nearly identical bills to
S.B. 1070, which assert state authority is separate from federal jurisdiction. 123
Upholding portions of the Arizona law meant that other states could now
force their officers to inquire about citizenship status and undercut any local
sanctuary policies. 124 In the first half of 2017 alone, more than 100 bills were
introduced in thirty-six states to actively combat local sanctuary policies. 125
In these jurisdictions, “the resulting environment for Latino communities is
so uncomfortable that the undocumented are held in a state of siege, and
some are forced to leave.” 126 Many states have embraced their new position
within the immigration enforcement regime, but courts have not been a
strong check against the resulting racial profiling on the local level. 127
Furthermore, federal courts all over the country have been inserted
into the original civil removal process. Operation Streamline, introduced in
2005, required ICE officers to refer any illegal entry cases to the U.S.
Attorneys’ offices, where undocumented defendants would be criminally
charged. 128 But unlike citizen defendants, these immigrants were brought
before a judge en masse, with as many as 100 people appearing before a
judge who would simultaneously read their rights. 129 In 2013, the Ninth
Chacón, Border Exceptionalism, supra note 104, at 623 (stating that “Alabama’s H.B. 56
is the most draconian state regulation to be enacted in the period before the Supreme Court’s
consideration of the Arizona law.”).
See Comparing Texas SB 4 to Arizona SB 1070, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (May 5, 2017),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/comparing-texas-sb-4-arizona-sb-1070/
[https://perma.cc/3AEC-V3D7] (showing a comparison chart of the two laws).
See, e.g., Betsy Z. Russell, Proposed Law in Idaho Would Discourage Sanctuary Cities
and Direct Law Enforcement to Question People’s Immigration Status, SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jan/30/idaho-house-panelintroduces-immigration-bill-targ/ [https://perma.cc/2R8Z-MP4R] (taking state action by
discouraging sanctuary cities and permitting local law enforcement to check immigration
status of those arrested).
See Chacón, Criminalizing Immigration, supra note 65, at 215 (using state and local law
enforcement to carry out immigration enforcement).
Culp, supra note 70, at 817.
Doraisamy, supra note 119, at 444–45 (“Bills targeting sanctuary jurisdictions start with
broad strokes, prohibiting local entitles from having any official policy of restricting
immigration enforcement or compliance.”).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446–47.
120

121

122

123

124
125

126
127

Id.
See Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and the
Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (MPI) (Apr. 2010),
128
129

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/arrested-entry-operation-streamline-andprosecution-immigration-crimes [https://perma.cc/6F42-TA4M]; see e.g., U.S. v. ArquettaRamos, 730 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plea court’s collective group
questioning of defendant and other defendants violated the rule requiring that the court
address defendant personally in open court).
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Circuit held that these hearings violated section 11(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 130 Then, in 2012, a fast-track plea system was instituted
across the country, increasing the number of criminal immigration cases
prosecuted in both border and non-border states. 131 The Justices of the
“undocumented cases” could never have imagined to what extent their
border exception would be applied to prosecute individuals within federal
criminal courts. 132
As more actors were charged with enforcement duties, many of the
techniques traditionally used at the border were transplanted into interior
communities by officers who had never set foot near the border. 133
Entrenching the presumed illegality of Latinos in the law allows federal
officers to set up interior checkpoints, local actors to inquire about
immigration status in routine encounters, 134 and prosecutors to oversee mass
plea deals. 135 Now, if the expanded expedited removal program is not struck
down, state and local actors across the country will be even more likely to
use their power to stop, question, and detain individuals based solely on
their perceived race. 136 A world without judicial intervention will be one in
which those who appear Latino will be required to constantly prove their

See Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d at 1141–42 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)).
See KiDeuk Kim, Organizational Efficiency and Early Disposition Programs in Federal
Courts,
THE
URBAN
INST.
3–6
(Dec.
2013),
130
131

https://www.urban.org/research/publication/organizational-efficiency-and-early-dispositionprograms-federal-courts/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/9L4Q-JM4H] (finding that from
2006-2009, almost every jurisdiction that adopted the fast track system saw an increase in the
number of immigration offenses prosecuted).
Id. at 3–4, 14 (describing how “the increased enforcement of immigration laws have
dramatically changed the landscape of the federal criminal justice system,” with immigration
offenses now the most common offense type in a system which affords prosecutors great
discretion to decide whether to bring cases or not “on the basis of practical considerations
such as competing demands for service and resource constraints.”).
See, e.g., Provine & Sanchez, supra note 111, at 475–76 (indicating the National Fugitive
Operations Program highlights how immigration enforcement on the border has spread to
the interior as the program was created to locate particularly dangerous non-citizens with old
orders of deportation, but now has over 100 teams all over the country conducting house
raids).
Id. at 475–77; KiDeuk Kim, supra note 131, at 14–15.
Grace Meng, Turning Migrants into Criminals: The Harmful Impact of US Border
Prosecutions,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(May
2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/22/turning-migrants-criminals/harmful-impact-usborder-prosecutions#_ftnref76 [https://perma.cc/TK23-KYJW] (finding that “[a] single
proceeding may include two dozen defendants or more than 100, depending on the district.
. . . the stages of a federal criminal court case that normally could take months or even years
are truncated into a single day.”).
Doraisamy, supra note 119, at 429–36.
132

133

134
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legal status as Americans. 137 This is not the world that the Justices of the
“undocumented cases” envisioned. 138

C.

Vagueness Affords Discretion – How Judicial Confusion Granted the
Executive Free Reign to Mass Incarcerate Latinos
i.

Conflicting Applications of the Border Search Exception
Among Lower Courts

Finally, the confusion surrounding the application of the
“undocumented cases” has issued a new type of mass incarceration that
must be stopped. The confusion among the lower courts regarding how to
apply the “undocumented cases” allows the executive branch to capitalize
off these unclear parameters and assume a dominant, unencumbered
position in the border region. Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte have
been read and applied differently by the lower courts, leading to confusion
and conflicting interpretations. 139 The trend since September 11, 2001, has
been for district courts to accept overt racial considerations, 140 but others
have flatly rejected the logic put forth in the “undocumented cases.” 141 Even
within the same Circuit, the permissibility of race is an open question. 142
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of race in Montero-Camargo, it
subsequently stepped back in Manzo-Jurado when it clarified that an officer
may use race as one of many factors that, under the totality of circumstances,
creates a reasonable suspicion. 143
It is also unclear how far courts will allow this Fourth Amendment
loophole to reach past the border, as “[t]here is no geographic brightline . . .
See generally Immigrants and their children are more likely to be profiled for citizenship,
SPRINGER (July 17, 2018), https://www.springer.com/gp/about-springer/media/researchnews/all-english-research-news/immigrants-and-their-children-are-more-likely-to-be-profiledfor-citizenship/15941598 [https://perma.cc/8RUC-8PZA].
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1168–69 (5th Cir. 1981) (mere suspicion
justifies a pat-down search and the removal of outer garments); United States v. Medina, 295
F. App’x 702, 706 (5th Cir. 2008) (accepting Brignoni factors); contra Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (adopting a much narrower conception of the border
zone when it concluded that 25 miles from a national boundary did not constitute a
“functional equivalent” of the border); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 859 (5th Cir.
1987) (adopting the Almeida “functional equivalent” test).
Connor, supra note 21, at 596.
See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Hispanic appearance was not a proper factor to consider in determining whether Border
Patrol agents had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants).
137

138
139

140
141

Id.
See United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing MonteroCamargo, 208 F.2d at 1132 (holding that Latino appearance was probative in a city that had

142
143

a Latino population of less than two percent).
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that confines the border search doctrine.” 144 Some courts have gone so far
as to apply the border search doctrine to justify racially-motivated stops
made 200 to 300 miles from the border. 145 This lack of guidance becomes
even more worrisome when one considers the ambiguity surrounding
expedited removal. Although the fast-track system has become increasingly
embedded in U.S. immigration policy, “the exact procedural and
geographical boundaries surrounding the enforcement of expedited
removal remain unsettled.” 146
The Supreme Court has never taken the chance to clarify the
border search doctrine. Indeed, Jennifer M. Chacón finds that:
[A]lthough some lower courts and immigration judges have
occasionally intervened to suppress evidence in the face of
egregious ICE illegality, the Supreme Court has largely
written itself out of any supervisory role in immigration
enforcement, and has provided no guidance to lower
courts as to when such interventions might be
appropriate. 147
With no higher guidance on how to supervise border officials, courts have
largely refrained from doing so. 148 Many argue that replacing the DHS’s 100mile rule with a new constitutionally-based version of reasonableness is the
only thing that will “prevent CBP from continuing to use the liberties
provided to it at the border . . . to search people in the interior without
cause, and to finally stem CBP’s erosion of interior Fourth Amendment
rights.” 149 This continued lack of judicial supervision grants executive actors
the freedom to build a regime of mass criminal prosecution wholly removed
from past civil deportation process. 150

ii.

Immigration and Drug Officials Fuel a New Type of Mass
Incarceration

Immigration policing and prosecution have expanded so drastically
that it has become one of the top federally prosecuted crimes, 151
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION, supra note 10, at 226.
Id. at 227.
Gebisa, supra note 39, at 572.
Chacón, Border Exceptionalism supra note 104, at 147.
Id.
Hannah Robbins, Note, Holding the Line: Customs and Border Protection’s Expansion
of the Border Search Exception and the Ensuing Destruction of Interior Fourth Amendment
Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2247, 2272 (2015).
Id. at 2276–77.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year
2016,
(2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and144
145
146
147
148
149

150
151

publications/research-publications/2017/FY16_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CXX6-TKWD] (showing that by 2011, immigration offenses were the
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disproportionately impacting the Latino population. 152 Starting in 1965, the
INA amended the number of immigrants admitted from each country 153 and
a “new Latino threat narrative” permeated the national consciousness as
more and more Central Americans crossed the border and stayed in the
U.S. without documentation. 154 This “threat narrative” ushered in the
support necessary to allow for the mass incarceration of the Latino
population, which steadily increased after September 11, 2001, as antiimmigrant hysteria was fueled by the war on terror. 155
As the government granted the INS and federal officials more
power and funding to regulate this area, the number of Latino men in prison
soared. 156 Douglas S. Massey argues that by 2010 “America’s immigration
enforcement apparatus had become a central race-making institution for
Latinos, on a par with the criminal justice system for African Americans.” 157
As a result, the Latino population is now grossly overrepresented in prisons
and deportations. 158 Indeed, Chacón argues that:
The current focus on punishing immigration through the
criminal justice systems at the federal and state levels does
not just echo the policies of the failed war on drugs, but it
actually opens up a new front in that war, raising the specter
of a new wave of racialized mass incarceration. 159

single largest category of federal criminal prosecutions with the bulk of those prosecutions
for misdemeanor illegal entry and felony reentry).
Id. at 8 (finding that Hispanics account for 96.2 percent of immigration offenders in 2016).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (granting authority to limit the number of immigrants from a specific
country); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(a) (1965) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1152).
See Massey, supra note 85, at 7–11 (describing how this narrative has led to an increase in
the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes by 24% from 2002 to 2007 and the number of
victims rose by 30%).
See generally id. at 3, 8 (finding the “[g]overnment repression accelerated markedly after
September 11, 2001 as the war on immigrants was increasingly conflated with the war on
terror. . . . the conditions for popular xenophobia returned with a vengeance with the . . .
terrorist attacks in 2001[.]”).
HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 218 (describing how the Border Patrol became the main
drug interdiction force at the same time that federal agencies became more involved in
immigration enforcement).
Massey, supra note 85, at 3.
See, e.g., supra note 8, at 167-217 (finding that Latino males are significantly
overrepresented in the number of deportees relative to their percentage of the immigrant
population and the unauthorized immigrant population); Peter Wagner & Daniel Kopf, The
Racial Geography of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2015) (describing the
racial disparities that define the Nation’s record growth in imprisonment, citing forty-one
counties where the portion of the county that was Latino was at least ten times smaller than
the percentage imprisoned).
Chacón, Criminalizing Immigration, supra note 65, at 217.
152
153

154

155

156

157
158
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Unfortunately, executive attempts at reining in overly-aggressive
immigration policies, such as President Obama’s Secure Communities
program, have not targeted high-crime areas like they espouse, instead
targeting areas with a large percentage of Hispanic residents. 160 This targeting
persists even in light of “the Latina/o Immigrant Crime Paradox,” with a
growing body of research that shows Latino communities have
comparatively low levels of crime. 161
Criminal and immigration law intersect to create such a disparity.
Federal drug prosecutions in the border region are conducted to meet wider
border control goals as prosecutors employ high-volume drug plea offers
that tend to be based more on the defendant’s immigration status than the
actual crime. 162 Daniel Denvir finds that “mission creep is abundant,” citing
government data that reveals new checkpoints are more likely to find
marijuana than undocumented individuals. 163 Mona Lynch’s 2013 study
unveils how drug cases on the border depart from prototypical federal drug
enforcement cases, as the line between drug and immigration enforcement
becomes indistinct. 164 This lack of distinction has driven huge spikes in the
number of drug convictions in border states. For example, she found that a
single southern border district’s “possession convictions, alone, accounted
for 83 percent of the nation’s federal drug possession convictions” in 2014. 165
Without judicial guidance to constrain officers from blatantly using race as
a proxy for illegality, Latino’s mass incarceration under the guise of
legitimate drug enforcement efforts will continue unabated.
IV.

CONCLUSION – THE TIME IS NOW

When President Trump announced his anticipated expansion of
expedited removal, eighteen attorneys general across the country joined
See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 89–
90 (2013) (finding that “[h]igh-crime areas were, surprisingly, not a priority in the rollout . . .
[but] early activation in the program correlates strongly with whether a county has a large
Hispanic population.”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs
Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 967, 975 (2015) (concluding that “the Obama administration’s immigration
enforcement agenda in fact operated to maximize removal numbers rather than to truly focus
on the protection of the safety of the general public.”).
Morales & Delgado, supra note 109, at 2–3.
See Mona Lynch, Backpacking the Border: The Intersection of Drug and Immigration
Prosecutions in a High Volume U.S. Court, 57 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 112, 116–17 (2015).
Denvir, supra note 107 (citing that “Border Patrol made 9,548 apprehensions and seized
156,239 pounds of marijuana at interior checkpoints, . . . [t]hat accounted for just under two
percent of the total 486,651 apprehensions made by Border Patrol but more than eight
percent of the total 1,922,545 pounds of marijuana seized.”).
See Lynch, supra note 162, at 113.
Id. at 120.
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together to amplify their dissent in an amicus brief for the ACLU’s case
challenging the act. 166 New York Attorney General, Letitia James, wrote,
"[w]e are fighting back to ensure that every person is afforded appropriate
protections under the law, and that this administration does not rip any
more families apart.” 167 This advocacy among some of the nation’s top
lawyers is a heartening indication that the national consensus around racial
profiling of Latinos may be shifting. However, it is not enough to create
systemic, long-term change.
Until the Supreme Court revisits its border search exception
doctrine, executive officers will continue to use it as a judicially granted
license, a free pass to employ race in key decision-making processes. For
many, including the Court, this doctrine has not presented itself as ripe for
review. But for millions of Latinos in the U.S. today, whether asylum
seekers, children, green card holders, or even full-fledged citizens, this
doctrine threatens their continued existence in the place they call home.
With the threat of a nationwide fast-track deportation system looming on
the horizon, the time for judicial intervention is now.

Daniella Silva, 18 attorneys general support challenge of Trump rule expanding rapid
deportations, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/18166

attorneys-general-support-challenge-trump-rule-expanding-rapid-deportations-n1045356
[https://perma.cc/N2MT-96PK].
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